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The Ontological Status of God and Other Small 
Questions 
Bonnie Miller-McLemore) 
If Freud created psychoanalysis to resolve conflicts between scientific 
Enlightenment thought and orthodox religious beliefs, as Martha Robert 
(1976), Peter Homans (1979, 1989), and others argue, then it is an under­
statement to note that he did not quite succeed. Instead Freud has left an 
intriguing morass-a legacy of intrapsychic and religious turmoil about the 
validity of religious belief in a postmodern context, a context his extreme 
modernism actually helped create. The work of James W. Jones, clinical 
psychologist and religion professor, might be characterized as one further 
step in the struggle between the truth of modern science and the vitality 
of religious faith. Religion and Psychology (1996), I would note at once, is 
indirectly about Jones' own sometimes convicted, sometimes estranged 
faith, even if not explicitly explored, and, more important for our purposes, 
about the postmodern faith questions of many scholars in the nebulous 
field of religion and personality, a field partly spawned out of Freud's own 
turbulence. For this reason, as much as any other, this makes the book 
interesting to tackle in the context of a pre-session of Person, Culture, and 
Religion. The last two chapters, "The Dilemmas of Reductionism" and "A 
Nonreductive Psychoanalysis," take us to the heart of the struggle, but the 
other chapters provide nice expeditions into related questions. 
In responding to Jones' book, I see my role as both theologian and 
feminist scholar. After briefly characterizing the development of his argu­
ment, I will address two concerns, the theological implications of Jones' 
epistemological and ontological arguments and his use of feminist theory. 
On both accounts, he alerts readers to problems that psychoanalysis as psy­
chological science is incapable of elucidating adequately. This invites more 
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dialogue with theology and feminist theory than Jones alone is able to sus­
tain. 
I 
Questions raised by an earlier publication, Contemporary Psychoanaly­
sis and Religion (1991), lead Jones back into three further explorations in 
Religion and Psychology: Freud's influence on the interpretation of religion, 
the role of gender, and the theological implications of psychoanalytic views 
of religion. In many ways, Jones' objective is quite modest, at least in the 
first half of the book: to show how new, more receptive or non-pathological 
views of religion evolve out of recent changes in psychoanalytic theory. Re­
versing Freud's own position, British object relations theory and the Ameri­
can school of self psychology suggest that religion arises from pre-oedipal, 
maternal dynamics, rather than from internalized paternal authority or dis­
torted narcissistic wishes, and plays a creative role in human well-being. 
Whether this answers or simply extends the problem introduced by Ludwig 
Feuerbach's unmasking of religion as a product of human imagination and 
desire is perhaps the biggest question left dangling throughout the book 
until the final chapters. Assessment of Jones' answer is especially important 
since he claims theological relevance for his investigation. 
The book is divided into two parts, according to Freud's genetic read­
ing of religion as a formation of the superego with the demise of the Oedi­
pus complex and his functional reading of religion as a deviation of the id 
in narcissistic resistance to the reality principle. The first part on "being 
human" investigates psychoanalytic and theological theories of the rela­
tional dimension of human nature and the implications for religion and 
therapy. The second part on human "knowing" moves from new under­
standings of narcissism and the id into epistemological hypotheses. 
Chapters in the first section move from Freud's analysis of the post­
oedipal origin of religion to concise summaries of large bodies of thought, 
from W.R.D. Fairbairn and Heinz Kohut to Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, 
John Macmurray, and feminist and process theology, all of which presume 
as fundamental the constitution of personhood and reality in relationality. 
RelationaIity as a core construct, over against Descartian models of isolated 
subjectivity and Newtonian views of reality, appears in various forms in 
physics, philosophy, and psychology. The fulcrum of human development 
and, in turn, pathology is not drives and oedipal resolution but the quality 
of early relationships. And religion is less a pathological aberration of mis­
directed drives than a significant factor in the self's pursuit of cohesive 
structures in a relational matrix. 
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The therapeutic implications are rather obvious. If transferential rela­
tions with the divine reflect pre-oedipal relational patterns present through­
out the rest of life, divine imagery becomes clinically significant. In Jones' 
words, "the clinician might approach religious material obtaining a feel for 
patients' relational patterns within their religious worlds and listening for 
echoes for the same relational themes in other parts of their lives" (1996, 
p. 64). The clinician's ability to deepen a client's capacity for richer mutual 
relationships also enhances the capacity to experience divine reality. 
Up to this point, Jones does not add much to his earlier work or the 
work of others. So people find and create gods in the image of human 
relationships. This, Freud (among others) established. What more do we 
glean from Jones' review? To my mind, the second part of the book, using 
recent psychoanalytic theories to revise understandings of knowing, is 
where the discussion gets interesting. Here Jones enters into the messy 
questions of the human experience of God's existence and epistemological, 
if not ontological, questions of divine existence itself. Changes in psycho­
analytic understandings of narcissism signal important changes in theories 
of knowing, including knowledge about divine reality. New views of narcis­
sism, the id, transitional process, and illusion as sources of creativity and 
imagination, rather than primitive states to be outgrown, signal important 
changes in psychoanalytic theories of knowing that cohere with philosophi­
cal arguments in Richard Bernstein (1983) and others about the insepara­
bility of objectivity from subjectivity and data from theory. As W. W. 
Meissner remarks, "Illusion . . . is not an obstruction to experiencing re­
ality but a vehicle for gaining access to it" (1984, p. 177). 
n 
Jones uses the term "theology" in his subtitle. The majority of refer­
ences to academic theology, however, fall in the first anthropological sec­
tion of the book rather than the second section. This is significant since 
the second section wrestles with serious epistemological and ontological 
questions about religious knowledge and reality. Does the relative absence 
of a more genuinely dialogical interaction between theology and psycho­
analysis mean Jones remains skeptical about theological or even confes­
sional constructions? In this second section his study remains a 
psychological assessment of religious symbols. The "dialogue" is heavily 
weighted toward the psychoanalytic sciences and the secular audience even 
if respect and space is given to theological resources. In contrast to the 
optimism about dialogue in religion and psychology a few decades ago, one 
wonders whether it now makes more sense to acknowledge and explore 
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the significant influence and limits of context and audience upon one's 
work. 
New understandings of religion and of the ways in which religious im­
agery revitalizes and binds connections within and between selves says very 
little about the nature or reality of the divine. In assessing the "ontological 
status of objects in the transitional realm" (1996, p. 140) in the final chap­
ter, Jones ventures slightly beyond-but just slightly-Ana-Maria Rizzuto 
(1979) and William Meissner's (1984) functional view of religious symbols 
as fictive creations. In the first section, before readers get to the explicitly 
epistemological section of the book, Jones remains tentative, as perhaps 
he should, given his professional orientation, readership, and the current 
postmodern context: a new psychoanalytical perspective may suggest the 
validity of a "targer, sacred reality" (1996, p. 68). The very relational nature 
of personhood, he seems to want to believe, assumes a more universal, 
encompassing relational reality known as God (p. 77). 
Jones, however, is careful to remain suggestive rather than declarative. 
He speaks through Buber, Macmurray, and others to image the eternal 
standing behind all relational encounters and does not rush into any claims 
of his own or consider in any extensive fashion scriptural or historical tra­
ditions or, as crucial, community practices. Without broader reference to 
religious traditions and practices, spiritual disciplines designed to open up 
avenues of divine interaction are greatly abbreviated. Jones makes unusu­
ally brief mention of prayer, devotion, meditation, and ritual as a means 
to religious experience and knowledge. Some theologians, best exemplified 
by a recent book edited by Dorothy Bass (1997), reclaim a broader array 
of disciplines all too often forgotten, such as hospitality, keeping the Sab­
bath, testimony, and discernment. But ultimately, Jones does not suggest 
that the therapist go beyond simply taking an interest in the religiosity of 
their clients to actively and self-reflectively addressing the ontological status 
of the client's religious ideation or daily practices. Perhaps all we can do 
at the moment is to admit that when it comes to talking directly about an 
ontologically "real" divine presence, "language limps badly," as John 
McDargh notes and early Jewish practice confirms (1993, p. 183). 
Jones walks a tightrope between academic, clinical, and confessional 
worlds. While he does not deny agency to a realm that we do not know 
(see Jones, 1996, p. 143), he does not claim that it is really there in any 
way independent of our knowing, creating, and interacting with it. Agency 
then remains in the projections, desires, and other psychological dynamics 
of the individual. This cannot help but have a limiting effect on any kind 
of divine agency. The question I raise for our consideration-and it is one 
that I suspect most of us have not resolved-is whether he, or each of us 
in our own work, should venture further. Steadfast reliance on a therapeutic 
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epistemology that knows nothing independent of individual experience 
tends to render religious belief solipsistic and egocentric, forbidding the 
viability of the theocentric demands of most religious traditions that assert 
a mystery, power, and comprehension beyond human knowing. From a 
theological perspective, such a position exposes the inescapably limited, 
idolatrous, self-centered character of human understanding and the ten­
dency to resort to utilitarian religion (that is, religion advanced almost ex­
clusively or exclusively because of its benefits to adherents). This sort of 
instrumental use of religion for temporal human ends of happiness and 
social success is sometimes misplaced and possibly theologically wrong, if 
not morally tempting and common. While a theologian must take into ac­
count humanistic and scientific interpretations of religion, a theological 
view "will never be fully substantiated by the results of the scientific studies 
of religion" (Gustafson, 1981, pp. 27-28). And to carry such an analysis too 
far denies "God as God" (pp. 25, 84). 
Nonetheless, for postmodern debates over absolute truth and relativ­
ism, Jones provides solid psychoanalytic infrastructures for a theory of criti­
cal realism. God is more than a mental construct. The reality of God exists 
in the intermediary space of interaction and is both there and not there, 
created and discovered. Objects of religious knowledge exist in the paradox 
of Winnicott's transitional space, with greater specificity within religious 
circles than without and accessible through spiritual disciplines. One gleans 
from Jones' reading of Winnicott and Hans Loewald a renewed apprecia­
tion and appetite for religious ritual and symbol. And Jones turns the table 
and provides a nice psychoanalysis of unbelief. The desire to reduce faith 
to witless or childish thinking embodies sexist repression of connection, 
idolization of objectivity, rejection of emotional experience out of fear of 
loss of control, and refusal to enter transitional space. 
Jones also introduces a helpful distinction between heuristic and ab­
solute reductionism. That is, he suggests the methodological necessity of 
the reductionism inherent in the social scientific study of religion as pref­
erable to a reductionism that claims exhaustive explanation of religious phe­
nomenon. But even heuristic reductionism-the study of one field in terms 
of another-can easily slip into absolute reductionism if one does not grasp 
something distinction about the original field on its own terms. And does 
this distinction itself still reflect the dichotomous world in which the scho­
lastic study of religion continues to operate, one step removed from ac­
knowledging its own fundamental commitments? Does heuristic 
reductionism assume a boundary between belief and unbelief that has al­
ready been crossed and obscured by the very postmodern theories Jones 
uses? Are we perhaps on the brink of some sea change in which we will 
see what we have been doing anew and finally move out from under an 
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enlightened prejudice toward specific religious beliefs in God? Jones him­
self suggests the insufficiency of the tenns "subjective" and "objective" and 
names both his frustration that a third category will not resolve the dichot­
omy and his hope for a more "radical restructuring of our understanding 
of human knowledge" (1996, p. 140). 
In 
In considering Jones' use of feminist theory, I raise a red flag on four 
accounts. First, as bell hooks helpfully reprimands feminists, one must not 
use the word carelessly, with loose or poorly-conceived definitions (1984: 
26). The tenn has had particular meanings, and those who use it have to 
define it clearly. It is interesting, perhaps problematic, to find a book so 
precise about certain categories, such as knowledge or religion or psycho­
analysis, yet less careful about the tenn "feminism." Discussion of gender 
analysis is not in and of itself feminist discourse. Nor do references to femi­
nist theorists make this a feminist book (which is not Jones' intent anyway) 
or a book which includes the subject of feminism (which the subtitle implies). 
The text is open to both of these. As an interesting question, one might 
ask what else is needed to transform it into either. If Jones means by femi­
nism, for example, the personal and political effort to subvert systems of 
suppression, oppression, and exploitation based on qualities of human na­
ture, most particularly sexuality and gender, would the discussion take a 
different course? I think so. In her critique of the proposals of conservative 
pro-family feminism, Judith Stacey (1986) complains that one of the pri­
mary propositions of feminism drops out of sight: direct struggle against 
systemic, structural subordination of women and a conceptual framework 
that analyzes the social processes through which individuals, cultural forms, 
and social systems are engendered. The places where this kind of analysis 
appears in Jones' explorations enrich the interpretation, for example, in 
analysis of Freud's theories as an expression of the history and movement 
of patriarchal religion. Other theorists, whether Kohut or Buber, stand un­
scathed. With feminist analysis, fresh questions might also surface. For ex­
ample, what is lost in understanding sexism and gender in the shift away 
from analysis of the boct}' and sexual drives in Freud's instinct theory to 
the analysis of subjective experience and relations in post-Freudian ap­
proaches (see Jones, 1996, pp. 33, 65)? 
As important, only two pages of text concern "feminist theology." And 
here Jones refers simply to Sallie McFague's Models of God. The omission 
of contributions of other prominent theologians is odd, particularly those 
with obvious relevance. To mention just a few, Catherine Keller's (1986) 
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outstanding investigation of relationality in psychoanalysis, myth, theology, 
and philosophy would have provided a fascinating means to explore the 
connection between sexism and separative models of selfhood. Elizabeth 
Johnson (1992) does the kind of historical retrieval of relational under­
standings of the trinity in classic Christian texts that might have greatly 
enriched Jones' analysis. And Marjorie Suchocki's (1994) combination of 
process and feminist perspectives in a fresh look at violence and sin would 
have shed light on the darker side of relational modalities. Given Jones' 
interests in both process and feminist theology, the oversight of Keller and 
Suchocki is hard to explain. 
Second, Jones is aware of the tendencies toward dualistic or stereo­
typical reading of gender differences in some of the feminist theorists he 
uses. This is good. But even he reads these theorists, primarily Nancy Cho­
dorow (1978), in a more skewed fashion than they might be read. Feminist 
psychoanalysis "stands Freud's argument on its head," Jones observes, see­
ing male, not female, development as problematic (Jones, 1996, p. 10). Yet 
Chodorow and others since her have seen both male and female develop­
ment as problematic when undertaken in the current context of patriarchal 
patenting and society. Neither male nor female can find and internalize 
adequate models of differentiation and connection when primary parenting 
falls to the mother and social structures reinforce misogyny. If men tend 
toward denial of connection, women tend toward enmeshment and weak 
ego boundaries. 
The work of Jessica Benjamin (1988) merits attention. She demon­
strates the tensions in early development between being recognized and 
recognizing the other and the ways in which ongoing sexism and socially 
constructed genderized injustices between men and women in public and 
private spheres perpetuate distortions in early development and prevent 
genuine mutual relations. On a related question of interpretation, is it ac­
curate to say pre-oedipal issues "displace" the father with the mother (e.g., 
Jones, 1996, p. xi)? Displacement seems a more assertive term than re­
quired by theories that emphasize preoedipal development and multiple, 
rather than single, lines of development. Or perhaps the term reveals the 
extent to which men and fathers do feel replaced and abandoned. 
Third, Jones illustrates with two cases that oddly revolve around am­
biguous father-not mother-images. With more time, we could have an 
interesting discussion of the cases themselves and the relevance of feminist 
theory for reconsidering the primary issues of each client. In this regard, 
I have a few related thoughts on Freud's theory itself. In Jones' lecture-style 
summations, Freud's perceptions of the father as a feared authority and 
dominating presence appear exceedingly dated in a post-patriarchal world 
in which fathers are either absent or, if present, struggle with lost authority 
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in the midst of ill-defined gender roles. And Freud's assumption that "com­
mon man understands ... his religion" in terms of a "system of doctrines 
and promises" also seems out of step with a postmodern world in which a 
pluralism reigns and the search for "religious feeling," that Freud so casu­
ally brushes aside, creates an entirely new market for New Age religiosity 
(Jones, 1930/1962, p. 21). 
At the same time, Jones' synopsis confirms that at least one reason 
why conservatives hold so tightly to patriarchal definitions of God is a re­
pressed rejection of erotic desire for the mother and the imposition of pa­
ternal law and order. None of this will be undone easily. Is it possible, 
more than Jones' acknowledges, to see the veracity of both Freud's reading 
of religion and the fresh readings of recent psychoanalytic theory, depend­
ing on the nature of the religious phenomenon or experience under obser­
vation? I am less willing to drop Freud's analysis in part because it does 
a better job explaining why there is still a lot more patriarchal religious 
practice than otherwise. Having sat as one panelist next to a conservative 
Promise Keeper on the television set of a news station through six hours 
of coverage of the Promise Keepers assembly in Washington D.C. in Oc­
tober 1997, I am not sure I want a "friendly assessment of religion" (Jones, 
1996, p. 23), given its current apparitions. Some religious ideation does 
seem heteronomously imposed on the individual during the oedipal phase 
in service of instinctual control. Religion still seems to operate as an in­
strument of power rather than empowerment, as much as we might wish 
it otherwise. 
Finally-and this returns to thoughts with which I began-in a book 
with feminism in the subtitle, one might expect more explicit contextual 
location of the author, more risks naming one's subjectivity, instead of a 
detachment from self-experience that Jones himself finds troubling in his 
clients (for a different approach to epistemological questions see Miller­
McLemore, 1992; 1994, pp. 134-36, 146-49). One senses that for Jones re­
ligion is more than a clinical interest. But perhaps he cannot help but fear 
the dangers of religious belief that he identifies-that it arrests individu­
ation, threatens regression, or signifies infirmity (Jones, p. 68). Readers are 
reminded regularly that religion can reflect more than pathology. But doth 
thou protest too much? And what kinds of redemptive possibilities has it 
held for the author? 
In bringing gender into the analysis, one must ask whether Jones' po­
sition is more revolutionary for male theorists and clinicians than for fe­
male. And in bringing theology into analysis, one must ask whether Jones' 
position is more revelatory for secular theorists and clinicians than for be­
lievers. It is simply less surprising to me, socialized female and habitually 
faithful, that "selfhood and interconnection are not antithetical but poten­
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tially mutually strengthening" or that re.igious practices contribute posi­
tively to health and growth (Jones, 1996, p. 68). 
Nonetheless, Jones makes important claims that new psychoanalytic 
and psychological theory is necessary if one is to understand the intrapsy­
chic and cultural role of religion in a changed world, a world secular and 
religious in ways that it has never been before. Freud is less wrong than 
short-sighted. The real question becomes whether there is a psychological 
theory capable of understanding the realities of psychological and spiritual 
life today and, as important, whether faith-committed theologians and com­
munities can pick up the discussion where Jones leaves off. 
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